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Abstract 
We examine the organizational dynamics of integration post merger. Our basic question is whether 
there is evidence of conflict between employees from the two merging firms. Such conflict can arise 
for several reasons, including firm-specific human capital, corporate culture, power, or favoritism. 
We examine this issue using a sample of Danish mergers. The results are consistent with the basic 
hypothesis. Controlling for other effects, employees from the acquirer fare better than employees 
from the acquired firm, suggesting that they have greater power in the newly merged hierarchy. As 
a separate effect, the more that either firm dominates the other in terms of number of employees, 
the better do its employees fare compared to employees from the other firm. This suggests that ma-
jority / minority status is also important to assimilation of workers, much as in ethnic conflicts. Fi-
nally, greater overlap of operations decreases turnover. This finding is inconsistent with the view 
that workers of the two firms may be better substitutes for each other. However, the result and our 
other findings are consistent with the view that more similar workers (in terms of either firm- or 
industry-specific human capital) are easier to integrate post merger. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A merger is a dramatic event in the life of a firm, for it requires the integration of two 
organizations into one. Indeed, the business press and management literature often argue that 
organizational integration is the most difficult hurdle to successfully completing a merger. 
There are at least two general sources of integration costs. First, explicit structures and policies 
must change. Second, implicit policies and social structures also need to evolve. This latter effect 
implies that workers are likely to be less productive when they have to work with colleagues 
who are more different from them. Thus, it generates both costs of changing the organization 
itself, and costs of decreasing productivity during transition. 
An implication of merger is that organizational structures must be reconciled, including 
business units, geographical locations, and hierarchies. Occupational functions must be inte-
grated, and overlap and redundancies managed. Human resource policies will probably have to 
be changed for at least one of the merging organizations, and possibly for both. Compensation 
levels and systems must be reconciled. 
An additional cost of merger involves subtler and probably more difficult social integra-
tion issues. Managers and employees from each firm have different corporate cultures, different 
firm-specific human capital and may even come from different industries. They could have dif-
ferent personalities due to different hiring criteria. Individuals have developed personal net-
works of social relationships with colleagues, to increase communication and efficiency. These 
networks will have to evolve as the structure changes. Employees have implicit contracts with 
their employer, on the basis of which they provide effort, invest in human capital, and have ex-
pectations about career prospects. When organizations merge, many of these factors must 
change. 
There is therefore a strong possibility of organizational conflict, most especially between 
the employees of the two pre-merger firms. Such conflict of interests is also likely to generate 
favoritism for colleagues of one’s former firm, only worsening the integration problem. Since 
these issues tend to draw lines between employees of the two former firms, a struggle similar to 
“ethnic conflict” may arise during the organizational integration. That, in turn, implies that the 
relative power of the two firms matters to how the merger plays out. For example, the more   3
dominant (larger) firm may end up dominating the merged organization, just as majorities tend 
to dominate minorities in society. Similarly, employees from the acquiring firm may have 
greater power than those from the acquired firm, because the acquired firm tends to sell control 
rights to the acquirer. 
Organizational integration post-merger has been studied in the social psychology litera-
ture (Haveman & Cohen 1994; McEntire & Bentley 1996; Stovel & Savage 2005), but has not 
been studied much within economics. In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on this issue 
by studying a sample of firms that merged in Denmark during the 1980s and 1990s. By using 
matched worker-firm data for the entire Danish economy over this period, we are able to iden-
tify a reasonable number of mergers, and examine what happens post-merger to the employees 
from two firms that merge. We compare the post-merger turnover and wage growth of employ-
ees from the acquirer and acquired. 
Overall, there is greater turnover and lower wage growth for acquired employees than 
for acquirer employees. This is consistent with the idea that the acquirer has greater power than 
the acquired firm post-merger, and suggests that the kind of “politics” that we consider in this 
paper do matter. We find that the more one firm dominates the other in terms of number of 
employees, the more successful are its employees post-merger. The majority does tend to drive 
out the minority after the merger, consistent with our notion of ethnic conflict between the two 
groups. Finally, when there is less overlap in operations between the two firms (different pri-
mary industry), there is greater turnover of both types of employees. This is inconsistent with 
economies of scope or scale, but is consistent with the view that the more organizational inte-
gration is more costly, the less similar the two merging firms are. 
II. THEORY 
 We examine the effects of merger on the workforces of the acquirer and acquired firms. 
Most models of mergers generate at least implicit consequences for the total size of the merged 
firm, but few generate implications about the subsequent composition of the workforce. To 
think about these questions, we consider the role of belonging to the acquirer or acquired firm; 
the extent of overlap in operations between the two firms; and the extent to which one or the   4
other dominates the merged enterprise. In our discussion, we refer to a merger of firms A (the 
acquirer) and B (the acquired). 
Acquirer v. Acquired Employees 
An empirical regularity in the small literature on the effects of merger on workers is that 
those from the acquirer fare better than those from the acquired firm (Brown & Medoff 1988; 
Margolis 2003). Several possible models of post-merger organization generate this result. For 
example, suppose that A buys B to increase capacity (economies of scale). We would expect A to 
try to implement its own technology more than B’s (since A is the acquirer). This implies that 
A’s employees should be better adapted to the merged firm than B’s, in terms of skills and firm-
specific human capital. 
  Alternatively, suppose that A buys B for governance. B has been allocating some rents to 
workers, perhaps in long-term contracts where at least some elements are implicit (Bertrand & 
Mullainathan 2003). These contracts may or may not be ex ante optimal for B’s management 
and workforce, but after the merger, A’s management can expropriate some of the rents. Once 
more we would expect B’s workers to fare relatively less well than A’s post-merger (Shleifer & 
Summers 1988). 
  These stories about differential treatment of workers from A and B lead to a similar con-
clusion, namely that workers from the acquiring firm have an advantage post-merger. More 
generally, if the acquiring firm has any advantage in power and governance after the merger, 
this result is likely. In our empirical work, we will examine how workers from the acquirer and 
acquired fare post merger, controlling for other factors. 
Dominance 
A merger of two organizations can be viewed as an assimilation problem, as in the eth-
nic conflict literature (see, e.g., Caselli and Coleman 2006, Monatalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). 
Two groups must find a way to work together. A member of the dominant group finds it easier 
to fit in than a member of the minority group, so minority group members suffer. Might a simi-  5
lar effect occur in mergers? We present a simple model, based on Lazear (1996), to explore this 
idea. 
  Firms X and Y merge (either can be the acquirer). Consider a worker from firm X, with 
skill λ (which may include both innate abilities and accumulated human capital). The worker is 
paired with a colleague, c with skill λc. Output Q is determined according to the production 
function  Q = τ·λ·λc,  where τ is a shifter of production. A worker from firm X can be paired with 
a colleague from firm X or a colleague from firm Y. g(λc) with the appropriate subscript (X or Y) 
represents the distribution of λ among the relevant group of colleagues. Pay equals expected 
productivity. 
  Workers are more productive if they are paired with a colleague from the same firm, 
since the innate traits they were recruited for, their human capital investments, their culture, 
and their social network are more similar. This is modeled as τ(X) = 1 if the worker is paired 
with a colleague from the same pre-merger firm X, and τ(Y) < 1 if the worker is paired with 
someone from the merging firm Y. 
  The probability that the worker is paired with colleague from same firm = p(∆)4. This 
probability depends on the relative number of workers from each firm. The larger is the 
worker’s firm compared to the firm that it merges with, the more likely is it that the worker 
finds himself paired with a colleague from his original firm. Call this firm X’s dominance (∆) 








= ∆  
                                                      
 
4 We do not model the pairing of colleagues. One extreme would be to pair colleagues with each other randomly, as 
in Lazear’s model of ethnic assimilation. That is clearly unrealistic, since the firm would pair workers strategically to 
reduce conflict. All that we need for our argument is that a worker may be paired with a colleague from the other 
firm as a result of merger, and that the likelihood of such a pairing is lower, the more that the worker’s firm domi-
nates the merged firm.   6
Thus,  ∆ ∂ ∂ / p > 0. 
 Expected  productivity  Q  for a worker from firm X is: 
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  Productivity before the merger =  X λ λ  is larger than Q unless average productivity of 
workers at the other firm is much higher than it is at the worker’s original firm. Therefore, pro-
ductivity generally falls as a result of merger. This captures the idea that organizational integra-
tion is a cost of merger. The merger must have some other justification, such as economies of 
scale or scope, which we do not model since our interest is in the costs of organizational integra-
tion caused by merger. 
  Each worker has the option of working at the merged firm, or quitting and working 
elsewhere. Assume that workers earn quasi-rents at their pre-merger firm. If productivity falls 
after a merger, the probability of efficient worker turnover rises, since the wage equals expected 
productivity. Thus, comparative statics on Q generate our empirical predictions about wages 
and turnover. 
  We can now see the effect of dominance on workers from each firm. Expected produc-








Unless expected productivity is much higher at the acquired firm, this expression is positive. 
Being a member of the dominant group improves expected productivity, because the worker is 
more likely to be well matched to the skills of his colleague. Similarly, being a member of the 
minority group reduces expected productivity. This prediction is quite similar to that in the 
ethnic conflict literature, where the dominant group is more successful and thus grows more   7
dominant, and vice versa. It is also similar to tipping-point models of market share in industries 
with positive network externalities. 
  Therefore, we predict the following effects of dominance: the more dominant is the 
worker’s pre-merger firm, the higher should be that worker’s wage growth, and the lower 
should be turnover, post merger. If the worker is from a less dominant firm, wage growth 
should be lower, and turnover should be higher. These effects should hold for workers from 
both the acquired and acquirer firms. While workers from the acquirer may have an advantage, 
that advantage can be reinforced or attenuated to the extent that the acquirer is larger or smaller 
in size compared to the acquired firm. 
Overlap 
  The discussion of dominance emphasizes the costs of integrating workers with different 
backgrounds. Dominance matters because differences in firm-specific human capital, corporate 
culture, personnel policies, and implicit contracts must be reconciled. An even more extreme 
integration problem occurs if the two firms operate in different industries. In that case, workers 
are likely to have industry-specific skills and human capital. Similarly, the more different the 
two businesses are, the more likely is it that explicit policies and implicit contracts are different. 
Thus, a merger of firms in different industries is likely to exacerbate the organizational conflict 
modeled above. 
  To see the effect of such overlap, assume now that firm X operated in a single industry 
pre-merger, and firm Y operated in two industries, one of which was the same as firm X’s in-
dustry. Thus there is some but not complete overlap of industry across the two firms. Workers 
who were employed in different industries are even more likely to be difficult to integrate with 
each other. Each group is likely to be more productive when paired with workers with similar 
backgrounds and training, which should be more similar if they have worked in the same in-
dustry prior to merger. 
  We can augment the model to account for this by breaking 1–p, the probability that the 
worker is paired with a colleague from firm Y, into the probability that the colleague in firm Y is 
from the same industry (qs) and the probability that the colleague is from a different industry   8
(qd). Thus qs + qd = 1–p. In addition, let the shifter τ be a function of whether the colleague is 
from the same industry or a different one:  τ = τ(•, s or d). If workers are less productive when 
paired with less similar colleagues, then τs = τ(•, s) > τ(•, d) = τd. Equation (1) becomes: 
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Once again, unless expected productivity is very different across the two comparison groups 
(colleagues from the same or different industry), we have an unambiguous result: expected 
productivity is lower, the smaller is the overlap between firms X and Y. We therefore predict 
that less overlap (greater difference) between the firms’ industries will imply lower wage 
growth and higher turnover. 
  This prediction derives from the view that integration of workers is less costly when 
they are more similar. However, there are likely to be other important factors in practice. For 
example, a merger of two firms from different industries may be based on a desire for econo-
mies of scope. If that is the case, then both types of workers may be needed to implement the 
new strategy (despite integration costs), resulting in lower turnover. Similarly, a merger of two 
firms in the same industry might imply economies of scale, resulting in excess workers and 
higher turnover. These economies of scope and scale effects would imply the opposite predic-
tion: namely, that less overlap (greater difference) between the firm’s industries will imply 
higher wage growth and lower turnover. Therefore, the actual effect of overlap or difference in 
operations is an open empirical question. However, finding that a merger of firms from differ-
ent industries increases turnover would suggest that organizational conflict is an important is-
sue in practice.    9
  We have made predictions about the effects on the employee’s wage growth and turn-
over of being from the acquirer or acquired firm; of the dominance of his pre-merger firm; and 
of difference or overlap in operations pre-merger. Many of our arguments are based on the im-
portance of “politics” to organizational integration. It is interesting to note that favoritism 
(Prendergast & Topel 1993, 1996) reinforces all of these predictions. All three effects imply that 
workers from A and B will to some extent be at odds with each other. That generates incentives 
for both types to exert favoritism for workers from their side. Such favoritism should be more 
successful for employees from the acquired firm, because their greater power gives them 
greater ability to play favorites. Therefore favoritism only reinforces any benefits to employees 
from the acquirer. Favoritism is also more likely to be exerted on behalf of a worker, if that 
worker is from the dominant group. Finally, workers may have some incentives to form alli-
ances with those in the same industry (not just the same firm), if the post-merger firm involves 
several lines of business. This would reinforce any conflict created by less overlap in operations 
between the two firms. We now turn to the empirical analysis. 
IV. DATA 
  The data were provided by Statistics Denmark, the central statistics agency for the Dan-
ish government. Statistics Denmark maintains several databases that can be matched and 
merged. For the purposes of this paper, two databases were combined. First, from an annual 
database of all Danish firms collected each November, a sample of private sector firms from 
1980 through 2001 was constructed. Those data include establishment codes for each business 
location within the firm, and the industry that each establishment is in. Information on estab-
lishments was used to define the sample of merged firms. Unfortunately, data on financial or 
business performance of firms is not available from Statistics Denmark, so we are unable to ana-
lyze the performance of the firms before or after merger (except by looking at employment 
growth). 
  Second, the firm data were matched with information on all employees in each estab-
lishment, collected by Statistics Denmark each November. Data on individuals includes educa-  10
tion and occupation codes, age, gender, wages, and experience.5 Since individual identification 
codes do not change when a worker changes a firm or leaves the labor market, we were able to 
measure tenure with the employee’s current employer. 
Identifying Mergers 
  The Statistics Denmark database does not flag mergers, so the first step was to identify a 
merger sample through inference.6 This was done by looking for cases where establishments 
from the same firm changed their firm code number from one year to the next. This was possi-
ble because establishment codes did not change if an establishment changed ownership from 
one firm to another. Therefore, it was possible to follow workplaces as they changed ownership 
over time. There are several possibilities: 
•  A firm changed its name / code number. This would be a case in the data where all (or 
almost all) establishments in a single firm changed to a new firm code in the same year, 
but no establishments from any other firm changed to the new firm code at the same 
time. Such cases were rare, and dropped from the sample. 
•  Two or more firms merged together to form a new firm. This would be a case where all 
(or almost all) establishments from two or more firms changed to the same new firm code 
in the same year. For example, firms A and B might merge together, forming the new en-
tity C. These were quite easy to identify in the data, since a new firm code appeared and 
typically the old firm codes disappeared (though it is possible that some vestigial part of 
A or B remained outside of C). 
•  A firm merged with part or all of one or more other firms, but retained its name. This 
would be a case where all (or almost all) establishments from one or more firms changed 
to the same existing firm code in the same year. For example, part or all of firms B and C 
might merge with all of A, with the merged firm called A. 
                                                      
 
5 Labor market experience since 1964 is calculated by Statistics Denmark and truncated at that date.  
6 Hostile takeovers are virtually unheard of in Denmark.    11
  The set of mergers was narrowed further to the most unambiguous examples. First, our 
sample was filtered to include only mergers for which two years of prior data was available for 
both firms pre-merger, and three years of data for the post-merger firm (thus limiting our sam-
ple to mergers taking place from 1982 through 1998). This enables us to study the dynamics of 
employees pre- and post-merger. Second, we dropped cases where a firm went through more 
than one merger during the sample window. Third, all mergers where one or both pre merger 
firms had less than 5 employees were dropped. This left a sample of 640 mergers. 
  A final step was the identification of the acquirer and acquired firms. This was obvious for 
mergers where firm A absorbed all or part of firm B, with the resulting firm still called A (the 
majority of cases; see Table 1). Where firms A and B combined to form C, we identified the ac-
quirer as the firm A that contributed the largest number of employees to the combination in the 
year of merger. 
Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 provides initial summary statistics. There are three types of mergers: A acquires 
all of B and the merged firm is called A; A and B merge to form a new firm C; and A acquires 
only part of B, with the result called A. By far, the first type is the most common, comprising 
over 80% of cases. The other types each comprise about 8% of the cases. As seen in the table, the 
number of mergers per year is roughly stable except for 1991; there is little evidence of macro-
economic effects on mergers in Denmark.  
  Table 2 provides information on the characteristics of employees from acquirer firms, 
acquired firms, and a control group, in the year before the merger. Previous studies (Margolis 
2003) found some differences in the demographics of employees from each firm. In our Danish 
sample, employees look virtually identical in the two source firms. Acquirer employees earn 
more per hour, and are a little more likely to have a college degree, but both differences are 
slight. Acquirer employees are also more likely to work full time (defined as 37.5 or more hours 
per week) by a non-trivial margin, and have a little more tenure at their firms. Overall, there is 
little indication that Danish firms merge for reasons having to do with differences in the two 
labor forces. We report the result of t-tests for differences in means between acquirer and ac-  12
quiring firms; the aforementioned variables have significant differences in means, but the rest 
do not.  
Comparing the characteristics of acquirer and acquired firms to a sample of non-
merging Danish firms,7 merging firms are rather similar to non-merging firms. The merging 
firms are larger and have slightly older and more educated workers than the non-merging sam-
ple, but the differences, apart from firm size, are small. Finally, Table 2 shows the distribution of 
modal 1-digit industry (by number of employees) for the firms in the year of merger. Most of 
the mergers are in either service or manufacturing industries. 
  In examining turnover in acquired and acquiring firms post-merger (Table 3), it is worth 
noting the high level of turnover of the Danish labor market generally.8 There are several Dan-
ish labor market policies that support this level of turnover. The Danish government provides 
extensive benefits and unemployment insurance to Danish workers if they leave their job, in-
cluding up to 90% of their earnings. Moreover, Danish firms are required to provide only one 
day of severance pay. Thus, the explicit turnover costs to both workers and firms are very low 
in Denmark, resulting in turnover per year of averaging 27% of a firm’s workforce. As we see in 
Table 3, post-merger turnover is high in our sample, but typical for Danish firms. In the year 
after the merger, acquirer and acquired workers leave at 20.4% and 24.8% respectively – sub-
stantial, but still less than the Danish average. Interestingly, turnover at the acquired firm is 
higher the year before the merger, at 31.3%, and a bit lower at the acquirer, at 24.5%. This sug-
gests that either the acquired firm may be undergoing some form of internal reorganization just 
before the merger or that workers from the acquired firm may react to the possibility of a 
merger by leaving before the merger actually takes place. The post-merger turnover continues 
this pattern, with turnover at the acquirer lower at 20.4%, and turnover at the acquired rela-
tively higher at 24.8%.  
                                                      
 
7 The control group of non-merging firms was constructed as follows: Danish private sector firms with greater than 
or equal to 5 employees, observed over the same time period (1981-97) as our pre merger firms.  
8 Turnover in Denmark is high partly because a number of transitions are included in the official statistics: transitions 
between work and education, job training, and generous family leave are all included, as well as the many transitions 
between part-time employment and any of the previous states (over two-thirds of Danes work part-time, many at 
more than one part-time job). See Westergaard-Nielsen (2002).   13
  Based on the theory above, we constructed the variable dominance (of the acquirer), 
which equals the number of workers from the acquirer divided by the total number of workers 
from the acquirer and acquired firms at the time of merger: 
 
acquired from # acquirer from #




This is a straightforward measure of the extent to which the new workforce will be dominated 
by employees from the acquirer. Typically, this fraction is above 50%, since the acquirer is usu-
ally larger than the acquired firm. In thinking about the empirical results, it is important to keep 
in mind that the model predicts the effects of dominance of the employee’s firm, but in the em-
pirical work dominance is measured for the acquirer. Therefore, for employees of the acquired 
firm, if the variable dominance is higher, that means that their pre-merger firm is less dominant. 
  Table 4 provides summary statistics on dominance. In the table, the sample is divided 
into dominance tertiles, where the first tertile is the third of the sample with the smallest degree 
of dominance of the acquirer over the acquired firm. The first panel shows statistics on the dis-
tribution of the dominance measure by dominance tertile. Not surprisingly, mergers with 
greater dominance of acquired over acquirer are more likely to have larger acquirers, and 
smaller acquired firms. The second panel provides information on the number of employees of 
the acquirer and acquired firms by dominance tertile. On average, a merger has about two-
thirds of its employees from the acquirer and one-third from the acquired. However, extreme 
cases are observed, where almost all employees come from either the acquirer or acquired firm. 
In the lowest dominance tertile, some mergers are observed where the acquired firm dominates 
post-merger employment. 
  To proxy for the difference in operations between the two firms pre-merger (lack of 
overlap), we defined the dummy variable difference in industry, equal to one if the modal indus-
try for employees from both firms is different at the time of merger, and zero if the modal in-
dustry is the same. Table 5 provides summary statistics on the measure of difference in industry 
between acquirer and acquired. What is clear from the table is that mergers of firms that pri-
marily operate in different 1- or 2-digit industries are not typical. Rather, 80-90% of all mergers 
are between firms with the same modal industry. Additionally, we see that the difference in in-  14
dustry decreases significantly – 6.4% at the 1-digit level or 7.1% at the 2-digit level - between the 
pre-merger and merger period. This is suggestive of some degree of reorganization before the 
merger on the part of one or both firms, as was seen in the pre-merger turnover statistics from 
Table 3, and of post-merger consolidation into the modal industry. 
V. RESULTS 
Probits 
  The main findings are presented in Tables 6, 7 and 8. Table 6 considers turnover, while 
Table 7 considers wage growth, each for one year and three years following the merger. 
  Table 6 presents four turnover probits in the year following the merger, two each for 
employees from the acquirer and acquired firms.  The first probit estimates the probability that 
the employee leaves from year 0 to year 1 post-merger, the second that the employee leaves 
from year 0 to year 3. There is a distinct difference in predicted turnover rates for the two types 
of employees at the year after merger: 17% of employees from the acquirer leave that year, 
while 22% leave from the acquired firm. The three-year predicted turnover rate is also higher 
for acquired workers - 51%, compared to 41% of acquirer workers. 
  The first explanatory variable in the probits is the degree of dominance by the acquirer 
over the acquired. For acquired workers, both the one- and three-year probits indicate that 
turnover is larger, the greater is the degree of dominance, with the three-year effect substan-
tially larger than the one-year effect. On the other hand, dominance reduces turnover of ac-
quirer workers, though only the three-year effect is significant. This finding is difficult to ex-
plain with simple stories of economies of scale and scope, which have nothing to do with the 
internal composition of the combining firms. Instead, this finding is more consistent with the 
idea that composition of the firm – and potential conflict between the two source firms – plays 
an important role in subsequent turnover. There are conceptually two effects. First, the more 
asymmetric the merger, the weaker the relative position of employees from the acquired firm, 
as the firm culture is more representative of the acquirer. Second, the more similar the employ-
ees of the merged firm, the more productive they are. Both effects might be captured in our 
dominance variable.   15
  Summarizing the results for dominance, we see the predicted effect: dominance in-
creases turnover of acquired workers and decreases turnover of acquirer workers. Of particular 
interest is that the effects of dominance on increasing turnover for acquired employees are lar-
ger and more significant than on decreasing turnover for acquirer employees. This provides evi-
dence that acquirer employees may have greater power than acquired employees. 
  Turning to the industry difference variable, if the two firms do not have the same modal 
industry (industry difference equals 1), turnover is higher for both the acquirer and the ac-
quired firm’s employees. This makes sense for two reasons. First, it is more difficult to integrate 
the firm when the production processes of acquirer and acquired are different. Second, the em-
ployees are poorer substitutes for each other. Note, though, that the effect is twice as large for 
acquired employees as for acquirer employees in the three-year probits. This is more evidence 
that merger affects the two groups of employees quite differently, and that those from the ac-
quirer are at an advantage over acquired employees. 
  A different conclusion emerges from the coefficient on whether the merger was “type 3” 
or not. A type 3 merger is one in which firm A merges with part, but not all, of firm B. In such a 
case, it is likely that firm A has not merged with the top management of firm B, and so organ-
izational conflicts may be less intense. We think of this type of merger as cherry-picking, where 
A chooses only a part of B to merge with, presumably that part which complements A’s 
strengths. If so, then firm B’s employees are not at a disadvantage compared to those from the 
acquirer firm. Indeed, the coefficients are similar in size for both acquirer employees and ac-
quired employees. Both experience reduced turnover in this type of merger. 
  The probits in Table 6 contain controls that are typically included in turnover analyses. 
Turnover is lower for those who have more experience and tenure with their firm at the time of 
merger. The greater the level of education, the less likely is the employee to leave the merged 
firm. This may suggest that employees at higher hierarchical levels are more shielded from los-
ing their jobs because of the merger. Finally, there is little effect of wage level on likelihood of 
turnover. This addresses the relevance of the model of merger for governance, since it indicates 
that economies from fixing previously inefficient (too high) compensation levels do not seem to 
be an important motivation for Danish mergers (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2003; Margolis 2003).   16
  Table 7 presents regressions with wage growth as the dependent variable. We regard 
these as a check of the robustness of the dominance measure to our story of differential treat-
ment of acquirer and acquired workers - there is reason to be skeptical of Danish firms’ ability 
to adjust wages. Scandinavian firms often engage in industry-wide wage bargaining with un-
ions (which cover large fractions of the workforce), and Danish firms tend to have a relatively 
high degree of wage compression. Looking first at the constant terms, acquirer workers do a bit 
better than acquired workers in wage growth, both for the one- and three-year comparisons. 
The dominance variable reduces wage growth for both acquirer and acquired in the one-year 
probits, and for acquired workers at in the three-year probit. The sign and magnitude of the co-
efficients on dominance reinforce the perception of acquirer workers faring better post merger 
as dominance increases. However, we do not place much emphasis on the wage results because 
of the institutional considerations just mentioned. We now return to turnover effects. 
  To control for the fact that observations might not be necessarily independent within 
groups (in our case mergers), we estimate turnover probits similar to Table 6 where standard 
errors are clustered at the merger-year level. Results are presented in Table 89. For acquired 
workers, the effect of dominance is similar to what we found in previous estimations, both one 
year and three years after the merger. We see this as an important validation of the robustness 
of the effect of dominance on acquired workers. However, the small effect we had for acquirer 
workers vanishes once we cluster standard errors10.  
To test the robustness of our dominance result, we also tried other specifications of post-
merger turnover. First, we add interactions between individual characteristics of workers as 
age, education, female and tenure at the pre-merger firm with the dominance and industry dif-
ference variables to check whether some specific groups were more targeted than others. How-
ever, in most of the specifications, the interactions were not significant and in the few cases 
                                                      
 
9 The reason why coefficients slightly vary between Table 6 and Table 8 is that specifications from Table 6 include 
year dummies while specifications from Table 8 do not. 
10 In addition, note that the other merger variables (industry difference and merger type 3) become insignificant with 
clustered standard errors. One possible explanation is that - as these variables are defined as dummy variables - there 
is not enough variation to get a significant effect once we cluster standard errors.  
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where they were, the magnitude of these effects was very slight. However, none of these speci-
fications did affect the magnitude of the effect of dominance on post-merger turnover. Second, 
we add pre-merger turnover (measured as one year before the merger) to control for potential 
internal reorganization prior a merger. While we found a positive and significant relationship 
between pre- and post-merger turnover, the effect and the magnitude of the dominance variable 
was unaffected.  
Nonlinearities 
  Up to now, our results have shown that dominance strongly affects the fate of workers 
after a merger, especially workers belonging to the acquired firm. However, our previous esti-
mations have relied on the assumption that such a relationship would be linear. In what fol-
lows, we use a semi-parametric approach to investigate whether post-merger turnover and 
dominance of the acquirer at the time of the merger exhibit a non linear relationship. 
To test for non linearity of dominance, we estimate the following model: 
 Turnoverit = ƒ(Dominance) + β·zit + εit , 
where zit are the covariates used in the previous estimations.11 We rely on a semi-parametric 
two steps procedure to obtain estimates of the coefficients β and an estimate of the function ƒ12. 
The first step consists of retrieving the partial residuals from an estimation of post-merger turn-
over and dominance on zit. The second step estimates non parametrically the relationship be-
tween the residuals of post-merger turnover and dominance. As dominance affects acquirer and 
acquired workers differently, both in the short and long run, we estimate the model on four 
                                                      
 
11 The covariates are industry difference, merger type 2 or 3, female, three educational groups, full time, hourly wage, 
merger size, and quadratics on age, experience, and tenure. 
12 We use the following semi-parametric procedure to estimate ƒ in the model yi = ƒ(xi ) + β·zit + εit. First, we regress y 
and x on z and compute the residuals, say εx and εy. For the estimation of y on z, we run a probit estimation and 
compute the standardized residuals, while for the estimation of x on z, we use an OLS estimation. Second, we per-
form a non-parametric estimation of εy on εx. We rely on lowess smoothing, which involves running a separate 
smoothing regression of εy on εx for each value of εy, meaning that a separate smoothing regression is run for each 
data point. The estimates plotted in Figure 1 use a bandwidth equal to 0.8.   18
sub-samples: acquirer workers 1 and 3 years after the merger, and acquired workers 1 and 3 
years after the merger. The semi-parametric estimations of post-merger turnover on dominance 
are presented in Figure 1.  
  The graphs plot the standardized residuals of post-merger turnover as a function of the 
residuals of dominance. We see that the results from the semi-parametric estimation strongly 
support our probit results. For acquired workers, the residuals from turnover estimation are 
increasing in residuals from dominance estimation, and the effect is quite marked after three 
years. Compare these figures for acquired to those of acquirer: after three years, there is a nega-
tive relationship between the residuals of turnover to residuals of dominance for the acquirer.  
It is interesting to note that the shape of the relationship becomes steeper with dominance. 
There seems to be a turning point after which acquired workers face a higher marginal prob-
ability of post-merger turnover. The effect is mild in the short run (bottom left panel) but dra-
matic in the long run (bottom right panel). For acquirer workers, the effect is reverse: after the 
turning point, workers enjoy a lower marginal probability of post-merger turnover, but only on 
the long run (top right panel). It is interesting to note that both turning points are located very 
close to the middle of the dominance axis. These graphs indicate that post-merger turnover and 
dominance exhibit a non linear relationship which becomes stronger once a given level of 
dominance is attained. 
CONCLUSION 
Mergers are difficult and costly to implement. Management often faces (or chooses) 
sweeping changes in production, composition of its labor force, financing, product markets, or-
ganizational design, compensation schemes, and the nebulous but critical element called ‘corpo-
rate culture.’ The focus here has been the effect on workers of this large disruption, and how 
these effects vary from acquiring to acquired firms with respect to dominance of acquiring 
firms. We posit two general kinds of effects. One is that workers who are more different from 
each other are likely to be less productive colleagues, because of differences in personality, hu-
man capital, etc. The second is that different factions – acquiring workers being one faction, and 
acquired workers the other - may have incentives to work against each other and for their own 
group. This second effect reinforces the first effect.   19
Due to the unusually complete longitudinal data from Statistics Denmark, we can follow 
firms and individuals before and after mergers. We focus on the effects of being from the ac-
quirer or acquired firm, dominance of one firm over the other, and differences in industry be-
tween two firms. We measure the effects on both wage growth and turnover. Because Denmark 
has such centralized and compressed wage policies, we find little effect on wages. However, 
there are clear effects on turnover. 
We find that employees from the acquirer fare better, all else equal, than those from the 
acquired firm. That result is consistent with the prior literature on the employment effects of 
merger. It suggests that the acquirer firm A has greater power (presumably derived from con-
trol rights negotiated at merger), which it uses to implement a merged organization more simi-
lar to A than to firm B, and to play favorites for its own workers. 
Our second finding is more novel: employees from the firm that dominates in size 
(which could be the acquired firm) tend to fare better post merger. This is evidence that workers 
from the minority firm are at a disadvantage after merger, perhaps because their human capital 
is not a good fit for the new organization, which is more oriented toward the dominant firm’s 
original design. It may also be a sign that workers from both firms engage in something like 
ethnic conflict with each other.  
Our third finding is that if the merged firms had different modal industries pre-merger, 
turnover is higher. This is not consistent with the simple view that economies of scope and scale 
drive employment effects of merger. However, it is consistent with the idea that organizational 
integration is more difficult, the more different workers are before the merger. That could be 
driven by lower productivity when workers from different backgrounds work together, or an 
additional dimension of factionalism and favoritism, or both. 
Our results tell a consistent story: organizational integration and the politics associated 
with it are costly. We find that mergers increase turnover, and our results are not consistent a 
simple story in which this turnover is caused by economies of scope and scale. Rather, the re-
sults all suggest that integration of different types of employees is costly in and of itself. The 
finding that acquired employees are treated differently than acquirer employees, along with the   20
other patterns found, strongly suggests that at least some of this is due to organizational “poli-
tics,” and not just lower marginal productivity of pairing workers of different types. 
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Merger type N%
A acquires all of B 539 84.2
A & B combine in new firm 50 7.8
A acquires part of B 51 8.0



















TABLE 1  -  Merger  Summary  Statistics
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Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Hourly wage (kroner) 114.8 40.7 123.6 52.8 Y  111.3 49.3
% Female 37.8 30.1 37.9 26.8 N  35.2 29.1
Age 34.6 7.0 35.0 6.7 N  33.5 7.2
Experience 11.0 4.9 11.3 4.6 N  9.6 4.7
Tenure 3.9 3.0 4.3 3.0 Y  3.4 2.8
Years of schooling 11.1 1.1 11.2 1.1 N  10.9 1.1
% college & masters 6.6 13.6 8.4 14.2 Y  5.1 11.8
% vocational 49.6 22.3 48.4 19.1 N  47.9 22.7
% community college 3.1 6.8 3.2 5.7 N  2.6 6.2
% full-time 32.2 24.1 34.4 22.8 Y  33.7 24.2
Firm size 36.6 150.1 128.7 361.6 Y  28.1 189.3
Industry (%)
Retail, hotels & restaurants
Manufacturing
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Turnover over 1 year
Acquired Acquirer
Pre merger turnover over 1 year 31.3 24.5
over 1 year 24.8 20.4
over 2 years 39.4 32.3
over 3 years 50.8 42.0
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mean 0.36 0.69 0.89 0.65
std. dev. 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.24
min 0.01 0.57 0.79 0.01
max 0.57 0.79 0.99 0.99
mean 32.8 84.4 268.9
std. dev. 72.7 153.0 616.7
mean 53.6 36.0 20.3
std. dev. 115.6 65.1 31.6
N 211 218 211 640
23
Overall
TABLE 4  -  Dominance of Acquirer over Acquired







(# employees from 
acquirer / # from 
acquirer & acquired)
1
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N% N %
yes 116 18.1 150 23.4
no 524 81.9 490 76.6
yes 75 11.7 104 16.3
no 565 88.3 536 83.8
TABLE 5  -  Difference of modal industry between Acquirer and Acquired
1-digit industry 2-digit industry
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Dominance of A over B 0.100*** 0.301*** -0.006 -0.023*
(0.0127) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Industry Difference  0.001 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.032***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
Merger type 2 -0.010 -0.005 0.006 -0.004
(0.312) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
Merger type 3 -0.023** -0.080*** -0.031*** -0.070***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006)
Age -0.019 *** -0.046*** -0.019*** -0.052***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Age² 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Experience -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Experience² 0.0001** 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0000
(0.0000) 0.00006 (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tenure -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure² 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female -0.005 -0.010 -0.010*** 0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Education - College -0.071*** -0.081*** -0.041*** -0.053***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.007)
Education - Vocational -0.020*** -0.044*** -0.034*** -0.046***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Education - Community -0.043*** -0.065*** -0.057*** -0.092***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.006) (0.009)
Full time -0.081*** -0.059*** -0.052** -0.052***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Hourly wage (kroner) 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Merger size  -0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
LR χ² 2954.96 4565.90 9143.74 14766.36
Predicted probability 0.22 0.51 0.17 0.41
N
Turnover and dominance are continuous variables scaled between 0 and 1. Marginal changes 
are reported instead of the coefficients. Standard  errors are reported in parenthesis. 
***/**/* indicates significance is at 1%/5%/10% respectively
TABLE 6  -  Post Merger Turnover (Probit estimation)
Acquired Employees Acquirer Employees
Dept. Variable:                     
Post Merger Turnover
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Dominance of A over B -0.043*** -0.028* -0.028*** -0.008
(0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
Industry Difference  -0.004 -0.005 0.0003 -0.017***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005)
Merger type 2 0.010 -0.020 -0.007 -0.041***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
Merger type 3 0.002 -0.005 0.0002 0.026***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.205*** 1.231*** 0.334***  1.130***
(0.033) (0.067) (0.019) (0.023)
Adjusted R² 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.21
N 17,092 11,207 64,155 46,891
Turnover and dominance are continuous variables scaled between 0 and 1. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicates significance is at 1%/5%/10% respectively
Controls
Age, Age², Experience, Experience², Tenure, Tenure², Female, 
Education Groups, Full time, Hourly wage, Merger size 
Models include year fixed effects
TABLE 7  -  Post Merger Wage Growth (OLS estimation)
Acquired Employees Acquirer Employees
1 year wage 
growth
3 years wage 
growth
1 year wage 
growth
3 years wage 
growth
Dept. Variable:                 
Post Merger Wage 
Growth
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Dominance of A over B 0.115*** 0.299*** -0.005 -0.025
(0.040) (0.079) (0.036) (0.069)
Industry Difference  0.003 0.023 0.034 0.015
(0.023) (0.070) (0.027) (0.030)
Merger type 2 -0.003 -0.023 0.009 0.028
(0.024) (0.050) (0.022) (0.037)
Merger type 3 -0.017 -0.081** -0.026 -0.058
(0.023) (0.038) (0.019) (0.030)
Wald χ² 759.42 931.67 2779.60 2819.09
Predicted probability 0.22 0.51 0.17 0.41
N
Turnover and dominance are continuous variables scaled between 0 and 1. Marginal changes 
are reported instead of the coefficients. Robust standard  errors adjusted for clusters at the merger
year level are reported in parenthesis. ***/**/* indicates significance is at 1%/5%/10% respectively
Standard errors are clustered by merger-year
Dept. Variable:                 
Post Merger Turnover
22,662 80,405
Age, Age², Experience, Experience², Tenure, Tenure², Female, 
Education Groups, Full time, Hourly wage, Merger size 
Controls
TABLE 8  -  Post Merger Turnover - Clustered Standard Errors (Probit estimation)
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The lines in the figure are graphs of the standardized residuals of turnover, as a function of the residuals of dominance of the ac-
quirer at the time of the merger. The upper panels graph the relationship for acquirer workers; the bottom for acquirer workers. 
Left is 1 year after the merger, while right is 3 years after the merger. The estimates are obtained from a semi-parametric estimation 
where control variables have been previously partialled-out as explained in the ext. The data are worker observations at the time of 
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